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Abstract
We use the U.S. Major League Baseball team level data in 1985-2015 and find an inverse Ushaped relationship between team payrolls and winning percentages. Furthermore, when
investigating the winning effects of pitcher and hitter payrolls, we find the similar curvilinear
relationship between pitcher/hitter salaries and team performance.
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JEL Classification Codes: L20, L83

1. Introduction
As a multi-billion industry, the average team payroll of Major League Baseball (MLB) has
increased quickly from $10.6 million in 1985 to $121.9 million in 2015 with a wide variation
in payrolls across MLB teams. In 2015, Los Angeles Dodgers ranked at the top with a payroll
of $272.8 million, while Miami Marlins’ payroll was at the bottom with $68.5 million. An interesting question emerges to baseball team management and fans: does the team with a bigger
payroll have a better on-field performance?
A number of studies in the baseball economics literature suggest that team payroll is an important factor forecasting team performance. Wealthy teams can attract the best players by offering the highest salaries in a free agency market and thus assemble a high quality team to
achieve better performance (Hall et al., 2002).1 Often, a team’s winning percentage is modeled
as a linear function of the team’s payroll in prior studies (Jane, 2010; Annala and Winfree,
2011).
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However, teams with largest payrolls do not always have the highest winning percentages.
Unequal distribution of salaries resulted from some ‘star’ players receiving a significant portion
of the payroll may discourage other players to provide effort and therefore undermines the overall team performance. Empirical studies by Wiseman and Chatterjee (2003), Jane (2010), and
Annala and Winfree (2011) indicate a negative relationship between payroll inequality and winning percentages. Furthermore, similar to the idea of a backward-bending labor supply curve,
initially players are willing to work harder for extra compensation at the low income level and
thus the team performs better on field. However, when income continues to rise, the income
effect might dominate the substitution effect that players would choose more leisure and thus,
less effort, thereby weakening team performance (Scott et al., 2005). In this sense, the payroll–
performance relationship may not be strictly linear even after controlling for within-team payroll disparity.
Our paper studies the relationship between MLB team payrolls and team performance and it
contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we re-examine the baseball payroll-performance
relationship in a non-linear setting and also take into account that team payrolls are potentially
endogenous, both of which have not been addressed in prior studies. We attempt to shed light
on baseball club management by providing better insights on the influence of team spending on
winning percentages. Second, we estimate the winning effects of pitcher and hitter salaries to
explore the possible differential effects of defensive and offensive capacities on team performance. Our paper is among the first ones to provide evidence on differential effects of payment
to defensive and offensive capacities on team performance that contributes to team management.
Using data on 31 MLB teams in the U.S. over 1985-2015, we find an inverse U-shaped relationship between team payrolls and team performance after controlling for endogeneity as well
as team and time fixed effects. A similar hump relationship between payroll and team performance is also observed among pitchers and hitters.
2. Methods
We estimate the effect of payroll of team i in year t on MLB team performance as follows:
𝑊𝑖𝑛_𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙2 𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(1)

where Win_percentageit is the percentage of winning games over total games played in a
season; Payrollit is the sum of all players’ salaries in millions of dollars deflated by consumer
price index (CPI); Payroll2it, the squared team payroll, is included to explore the possible
curvilinear relationship between a team’s payroll and its performance; Giniit is the Gini
coefficient measuring the disparity of team salary distribution. We also control for team specific
fixed effects, 𝛿𝑖 , and year fixed effects, 𝛾𝑡 . Lastly, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the random error.
The variable Payroll is potentially endogenous as there might be two-way causality between
team payrolls and team performance. Higher payrolls can lead to a team of better talents which
increases the potential to win. When teams win more, they tend to generate more revenue
(Scully, 1974; Bradbury, 2010). As club owners have access to more financial capital, they
might be willing to pay more to attract talented players or retain current outstanding free agents
in order to maintain their competitiveness. Furthermore, the findings in Hall et al. (2002) that
team performance Granger causes wages using the MLB data over 1980 – 2000 also suggest
the possible causality from performance to payroll. To address the potential endogeneity
concern, we follow Jewell and Molina (2004) and include mean team age, the squared mean
team age, market size proxied by the metropolitan population where the team is located, and a
dummy variable for whether the team plays in the National League as instruments for the team
payroll. The use of mean team age and its squared term is consistent with the Mincer-type
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earnings relationship. A large market size may help a team to generate more revenue and pay
higher salaries but may not directly affect its winning percentage. The dummy variable controls
for the possible difference in team salary structure between the National League and the
American League.
To explore the offensive and defensive contributions to team victories, we define pitchers as
defensive players and hitters as offensive players, following Scully (1974). While this method
of categorizing is not perfect because there is no clear definition of defensive or offensive
position in MLB, it is an efficient way to capture most players that fall into these two categories.
Then we aggregate salaries of pitchers and hitters by team to generate variables Pitcher_payroll
and Hitter_payroll, which are also converted to real values using CPI. We will substitute
Payroll in Eq. 1 by Pitcher_payroll and Hitter_payroll respectively as well as their squared
term and present the estimated results in Section 4.
3. Data
All baseball related data are obtained from the website of the Lahman Baseball Database2. The
winning percentage (Win_percentage) is constructed by taking the wins of each team divided
by total games played in a year multiplied by 100. The winning percentage takes a value
between zero and 100. Team payroll, pitcher payroll or hitter payroll is an aggregate of salaries
over all players, pitchers or hitters measured in millions of dollars. The salary data are open day
salaries. In the case that players may be hurt, traded, or called up during a season and thus are
not able to play, the salaries of players who do not play a single game in a season are not
included in the total team salary. Furthermore, to rid the impact of inflation, all payroll variables
are divided by CPI and converted to their real value. The CPI data are obtained from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, with a base year of 1982-1984. The Gini coefficient measuring the disparity
of player salary distribution is calculated by authors for each team in every year. The Gini
coefficient is an index between zero and one. Data on the U.S. metropolitan population are
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. For Canadian teams, the data on metropolitan
population are from Statistics Canada.
Table 1. MLB team list.
Arizona Diamondbacks
Atlanta Braves
Baltimore Orioles
Boston Red Sox
Chicago White Sox
Chicago Cubs
Cincinnati Reds
Cleveland Indians
Colorado Rockies
Detroit Tigers
Houston Astros
Kansas City Royals
Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim
Los Angeles Dodgers
Miami Marlins
Milwaukee Brewers
2

Minnesota Twins
Montreal Expos
New York Yankees
New York Mets
Oakland Athletics
Philadelphia Phillies
Pittsburgh Pirates
San Diego Padres
Seattle Mariners
San Francisco Giants
St. Louis Cardinals
Tampa Bay Rays
Texas Rangers
Toronto Blue Jays
Washington Nationals

http://www.seanlahman.com/baseball-archive/statistics/.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Win_percentage (%)
Payroll ($million)

888
888

49.985
29.167

6.880
17.273

26.543
0.450

71.605
106.676

Gini (units)

888

0.561

0.074

0.286

0.750

Pitcher_payroll ($million)

888

13.413

8.548

0.546

49.486

Hitter_payroll ($million)

888

17.514

10.922

0.229

66.960

Determined by data availability, our sample covers 31 MLB teams over 1985 - 2015. The
sample is unbalanced. We provide the list of teams in Table 1 and descriptive statistics in Table
2. A scatter plot of polynomial estimates of winning percentage against team payroll is
presented in Figure 1, which shows that winning percentage trends up as team payroll increases
but starts to decline when team payroll is about $90 million.
Figure 1. Polynomial plot of winning percentage and team payroll.
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4. Results
Fixed-effects estimated results of Eq. 1 are displayed in columns (1) and (2) in Table 3. Both
regressions show that a team’s payroll is an important factor to predict its winning percentage,
which echoes findings in previous studies. Furthermore, our results show strong support for the
non-linear relationship between team payroll and team performance. The coefficient on payroll
is positive and significant at the 1% level and the coefficient on squared payroll is negative and
significant at the 5% level or better in both regressions. Regression 3.2 suggests that for an
average MLB team in 2015 with a payroll at $49 million, a $1 million rise in team payroll will
increase the team winning percentage by 0.3 percentage point, which is approximately an
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increase of 0.5 game in wins, on average.3,4 In other words, to win one additional game, the
team needs to increase its payroll by $2 million, a 4.1% increase from the sample average MLB
team payroll in 2015. These results provide a possible explanation why MLB teams continue
to pay higher salaries to their players. Furthermore, regression 3.2 indicates that the positive
effect of an increase in payroll on team performance peaks at about $87.6 million, consistent
with our observation from Figure 1. Our results imply that initially, offering higher salaries to
attract talents would have a positive impact on team performance. However, beyond the
inflection point, there could be a drop in winning percentages associated with higher payrolls.
Table 3. Regression results.
3.1
FE

3.2
FE- IV

3.3
FE

3.4
FE

Payroll

0.425***

0.701***

0.352**

0.409***

[0.065]

[0.131]

[0.171]

[0.083]

Payroll2

-0.003***

-0.004**

-0.002

-0.003***

[0.001]

[0.002]

[0.002]

[0.001]

Top_Payroll

3.5
FE

3.6
FE-IV

3.7
FE

3.8
FE-IV

-0.043
[0.348]

Gini

-20.096*** -21.407***
[4.811]

[5.027]

-12.629 -20.137*** -17.734*** -17.162*** -20.846*** -27.086***
[10.043]

[6.262]

Pitcher_payroll
Pitcher_payroll

2

[5.044]

[5.173]

0.659***

1.414***

[0.116]

[0.332]

-0.009***

-0.015*

[0.002]

[0.009]

Hitter_payroll
Hitter_payroll

2

[5.145]

[5.419]

0.393***

1.282***

[0.086]

[0.265]

-0.004***

-0.014**

[0.001]

[0.006]

kleibergen-Paap
underidentification
test: 𝑝 value

−

0.0000

−

−

−

0.0018

−

0.0000

Hansen overidentification test: 𝑝
value

−

0.1946

−

−

−

0.6414

−

0.2627

Year fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Team fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observation

888

888

303

585

888

888

888

888

0.1097

0.0454

0.1236

0.1352

0.0785

0.0994

0.0612

0.1115

R-squared

Note: Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

3

The average number of games played in a season over the sample period is 160; as a result, a 0.3 percentage
point increase in winning percentage is equivalent to winning an additional 0.48 game, which is obtained by
0.003*160=0.48.
4
Test statistics suggest that the instruments are valid because the null hypothesis of the kleibergen-Paap underidentification test is rejected at the 1% level and that of the Hansen over-identification test cannot be rejected at
conventional levels.
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The coefficient on the Gini coefficient is negatively significant, suggesting that unequal
distribution of salary is associated with a lower team performance. This is consistent with the
argument that greater salary inequality can lead to lower team productivity and less cooperation
among players and hence worsen team performance. One could argue that the negative effect
of salary dispersion on winning percentage could be attributed to some high-paid players
producing at a level that does not justify their pay, rather than less cooperation among team
members. To further explore this, we consider a high-paid player as a player whose salary is
three standard deviations above the team average. In regression 3.3, we create the variable
Top_Payroll as the sum of high-paid players’ salaries and Payroll is redefined as the sum of
other players’ salaries in the team. 5 Meanwhile, Payroll2 is still the squared team payroll
including all players. The fixed-effects estimation shows that Top_Payroll has an insignificant
effect while the coefficient on payroll of the rest of players remains significantly positive. In
the meantime, the coefficient of Gini coefficient becomes insignificant. For comparison, we reestimate Eq. 1 using observations from teams that do not have high-paid players and report
findings in regression 3.4. Results in regression 3.4 are similar to those in regressions 3.1 and
3.2, confirming the hypothesis that greater salary dispersion reduces within team cooperation
and thereby negatively affects team winning percentage. Indeed, the findings in regression 3.3
also suggest that a significant share (about 21%) of team salary paid to the superstars may not
always be worthwhile considering the insignificant effect of high-paid players’ salary on wins.6
Results of the winning effects of defensive and offensive payrolls on team performance are
reported in regressions 3.5 – 3.8. 7 Both positions contribute positively to team winning
percentages and a similar hump shape relationship exists between each position’s payroll and
team performance. In particular, regressions 3.6 and 3.8 suggest that a $1 million increase in
pitcher payroll will increase the winning percentage by 1.01 percentage points on average and
a similar increase in hitter payroll is associated with a 0.79 percentage point improvement in
winning percentage on average. 8 Further computation reveals that the inflection point
associated with pitcher payroll is around $47.13 million and the inflection point associated with
hitter payroll is about $45.79 million.
It is well known that baseball salaries have increased much faster than other prices. As a
robustness check, we replace our payroll variable by a typified variable (ZPayroll) in our
regressions. The typified payroll is constructed by subtracting the average payroll of all teams
in year t from the payroll of team i in year t and then dividing the difference by the standard
deviation of payroll for all teams in year t. Similarly, we transform pitcher and hitter payrolls
to their corresponding typified variables as well. We substitute Payroll and squared Payroll in
Eq. 1 by the typified payroll variable and its squared term. The fixed-effects and IV fixedeffects results using the typified payroll are presented in regressions 4.1 and 4.2 of Table 4. 9
The findings are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3 – initially, a rise in team payrolls will
lead to better performance; but once beyond the inflection point, further rise in team payrolls
tend to decrease the winning percentage. This curvilinear relationship, by and large, holds for
the typified payroll of pitcher and hitter as displayed in regressions 4.3, 4.5 and 4.6, although
the coefficient of squared typified pitcher payroll is not estimated precisely in regression 4.4.
5

Top_Payroll and Payroll are both deflated by CPI.
The mean salary for high-paid players is $5.20 million, accounting for 21% of the team salary; while the average
team salary including high-paid players is $24.73 million.
7
Regressions 3.6 and 3.8 employ the same instruments as in regression 3.2. The instruments are valid as well.
8
These estimates are based on the sample averages of hitter and pitcher payrolls.
9
The mean team age and its squared term, metropolitan population and the dummy variable for national league
are indicated as weak instruments for typified payroll variables. To address this concern, we include the first and
second lags of typified payroll and its quadratic term as potential instruments. The specific instruments included
in the regression are determined by the kleibergen-Paap under-identification and Hansen over-identification tests.
6
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We also note that the R2 values in Table 4 have improved compared to those in Table 3, yet
they are still relatively low. This could be due to the long time span of our sample. For example,
the R2 based on the full sample in Annala and Winfree (2011) is 0.1882 using the U.S. MLB
data over 1985-2004, comparable in value to the R2 in our regressions.
Table 4. Robustness check.

𝑍𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙
2
𝑍𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙

Gini

4.1
FE
2.438***

4.2
FE-IV
4.759***

[0.293]

[0.567]

-0.296*

-0.391*

[0.177]

[0.234]

4.3
FE

4.4
FE-IV

4.5
FE

4.6
FE-IV

-18.765*** -21.554*** -17.293*** -20.977*** -20.583*** -30.377***
[4.458]

[5.557]

𝑍𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙
2
𝑍𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙

[4.501]

[5.787]

3.187***

2.974***

[0.528]

[0.972]

-1.311*

-1.847

[0.670]

[1.447]

𝑍𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙
2
𝑍𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙

[4.500]

[5.934]

1.562***

5.414***

[0.280]

[0.659]

-0.317*

-1.095***

[0.176]

[0.385]

kleibergen-Paap
underidentification
test: 𝑝 value

−

0.000

−

0.000

−

0.000

Hansen overidentification test: 𝑝
value

−

0.1452

−

0.3290

−

0.7640

Year fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Team fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

888

798

888

826

888

826

0.149

0.0523

0.104

0.0917

0.0890

0.149

R-squared

Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

5. Conclusion
This study assesses the relationship between MLB team payrolls and winning percentages. Our
findings suggest that initially when a team pays more to players, it can enhance its winning
percentage. Yet, such a positive effect disappears after a threshold value of team payroll is
reached. Our results remain robust after we control for possible endogeneity of a team’s payroll
as well as to an alternative measure of team payroll. Furthermore, we look at pitcher and hitter
payrolls to disentangle the winning effects of defensive and offensive capacities. We find a
similar inverse U-shaped relationship between salaries for pitchers and hitters and winning
percentages.
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